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THE BURGER COURT & PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS:
A STUDY IN LAW, POLITICS & EDUCATIONAL
REALITY
DONALD E. BOLES*
INTRODUCTION
Few expected much from the Nixon appointees to the Supreme
Court as far as expanding the protection of human liberties under
the Bill of Rights' guarantees, and their record to date suggests
that such expectations were not totally unfounded.' While this
article is primarily devoted to church-state issues affecting the
parochial elementary and secondary school, an overview of the
Burger Court's views on civil liberties protection seems in order at
the outset. At a minimum, this may reveal strands of consistency in
the decision-making patterns and theories of jurisprudence within
the Court as presently constituted.
In this respect, the field of church-state relations and the
issues growing out of various attempts to provide governmental aid
to parochial schools have provided some of the most vexatious
problems confronting judicial and legislative policymakers since
World War II. Indeed, Mr. Nixon and his supporters aimed some
of their sharpest attacks upon the Warren Court's decisions in this
area and related programs of prayer,' Bible reading in the public
schools,' and similar attempts to retain the sanctity of the "Wall
*Professor of Political Science, Iowa State University. Author: THE BIBLE,
RELIGION & THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1965); THE Two SwoRDs: CASES & CON-
TROVERSIES IN RELIGION (1968).
1. See Gerringer, Burger Court and the Bill of Rights, 8 TRIAL LAW-
YER's Q. 29 (1972); Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment of Supreme
Court Justices, 1972 LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 183 (1972) ; Kurland, 1970 Term:
Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 S. CT. Rsv. 181
(1971); McGee, Blacks, Due Process and Efficiency in the Clash of Values
as the Supreme Court Moves to the Right, 2 BLACK L.J. 220 (1972); Nixon's
Court, NATION 213, 290-91 (Oct. 4, 1971) ; Reid, Burger Court and the Civil
Rights Movement: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away, 3 RuTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 410 (1972); Remaking the Supreme Court,
Nixon Sets a Pattern, 71 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 15-17 (Nov. 1, 1971);
Supreme Court: End of an Era, 97 TIME, June 21, 1971, at 41-42.
2. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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of Separation Between Church and State."4 Moreover, Mr. Nixon
was to utilize aid to parochial schools (which he regularly referred
to only as private schools) as an important ploy in his bid for re-
election in 1972.' Thus, it should be especially interesting to view
the attitude of the Nixon appointees on these precise issues.
Looking first at the disposition by the Supreme Court of cases
generally where a person asserts a constitutional or civil right, one
striking point emerges. In the last two decades, the Court had in-
variably decided more cases favorably to the person asserting a
right until the Burger Court came into being and dramatically
altered this pattern. In 1969-1970, the first year of Chief Justice
Burger's tenure, the proportion of favorable votes dropped from the
81.2 percent it had been in the last year of the Warren Court to
55.8 percent. In the 1970-1971 term, the number dropped to 48
percent, marking the first time in years that the Supreme Court
had decided more than half the cases heard unfavorably to the
person asserting a constitutional right. In the 1971-1972 term,
the number of cases decided favorably to an asserted right jumped
to 60.2 percent; but in the 1972-1973 term, it dropped precipitously
to only 43.5 percent supportive of a right asserted and in the 1973-
1974 term, 47.4 percent of the cases were decided in favor of one
asserting civil or constitutional rights.'
In short, during the five years of Chief Justice Burger's tenure,
an average of 50.8 percent of the Supreme Court's decisions have
4. An example of a legislative attack on the results of both Schempp and
Engel was seen on November 8, 1971, when H.R.J. Res. 191, was voted upon.
H.R.J. Res. 191 was a proposed Constitutional amendment which provided
"[N]othing contained in this Constitution shall abridge the right of persons
lawfully assembled, in any public building which is supported in whole or in
part through the expenditure of public funds, to participate in voluntary
prayer or meditation." Although a majority of House members voted for the
resolution, it failed to get the requisite two-thirds majority. 39 C.Q. WEEKLY
REP. 2307 (1971).
5. See Excerpts from the President's Special Message to Congress on
Education Reform, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1970, at 28; McWilliams, The
Church-State Issue, 214 NATION 515-16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McWil-
liams]; Nixon's Views on Aid to Private Schools: Text of Address Given
April 6, 1972, 72 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 97-98 (April 17, 1972) [here-
inafter cited as Nixon's Views]; Shanahan, Nixon Asks Tax Law Shift to
Ease Filing on Income, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at 1, 35 [hereinafter cited as
Shanahan]; Swomley, Manipulating the Blocs: Church, State and Mr. Nixon,
215 NATION 168-71 (Sept. 11, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Swomley].
6. For a detailed summary and analysis of the Court's voting behavior
see Commission on Law, Social Action and Urban Affairs of the American
Jewish Congress, The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court for the 1973-74 Term: A Summary and Analy-
sis (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions].
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THE BURGER COURT
been supportive of asserted constitutional rights. In contrast, the
Warren Court, in its last one and one-half decade, averaged 71.7
percent of its decisions in favor of an asserted right with the pro-
portion of favorable decisions ranging from 51.2 percent to 82.5
percent during that period. Clearly, the anticipated swing away
from a position strongly supportive of asserted constitutional
rights by the Nixon appointees seems to be supported by the facts
to date.
This data should not, however, obscure the fact that the Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Burger, continues to devote
a high proportion of its time to civil liberties decisions among the
total number of decisions decided by the Court with written
opinions. In the 1973-1974 term, which closely resembles the 1972-
1973 term, of a total of 169 cases decided with a written opinion, 77
dealt with the general field of civil liberty rights. This amounted
to 44.4 percent of the Court's workload. The Court has not turned
its back on those looking to it for protection of basic liberties, as it
might since the power to change exists by simple expedient of
refusing to accept appeals in cases of this nature. But, it would
be a mistake to immediately infer from this that a basic sympathy
for asserted civil liberty rights exists among a majority, since
the more conservative members may vote to take jurisdiction for
the sole purpose of formalizing or nailing down a more restrictive
view of human rights.
On the other hand, analysis of the opinions during the tenure
of Chief Justice Burger suggests that though the Nixon appointees
plus Justice White comprising the conservative bloc" on the Court
constitute a majority, the Burger Court has not at this juncture
embarked upon a systematic erasure of the Warren Court's liber-
tarian rulings in areas such as racial segregation," legislative mal-
apportionment" or freedom of unpopular expression."0 The steady
broadening of the bounds of such constitutional guarantees of free-
7. R.E. Morgan in Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final
Installment?, 1973 S. CT. Rav. 57-97 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Morgan],
presents the views of a number of the Court's critics with regard to blocs
within the Court. The Court's disposition is 3 to 3 to 3: the Accommodation-
ist bloc including White, Burger and Rehnquist; the Super-separationist
bloc including Brennan, Douglas and Marshall; the Moderately-separationist
bloc including Stewart, Blackmun and Powell.
8. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Bradley v. School Board
of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
9. American Party of Texas v. Wright, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); O'Brien
v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
10. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Jenkins v.
1975]
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dom and equality which characterized the Warren Court, however,
has ceased.
In some areas, nonetheless, there have been reversals of direc-
tion. These include the rights of persons charged with crimes"
and in the field of censorship of obscenity." Even here the trend
has not been uniform, and some have argued that the recent high
proportion of unfavorable decisions should not be viewed as judicial
action restricting basic rights but rather as an indication that the
Burger Court has declined to extend guarantees beyond the point
to which the Warren Court had established them. 3
In only one area does the Burger Court appear to support
a Bill of Rights guarantee more than did the Warren Court. That
concerns the "establishment of religion" clause of the first amend-
ment, particularly in litigation regarding governmental aid to
parochial schools.' In the last two terms, the Supreme Court has
handled five cases raising questions involving the "establishment
of religion" clause as applied to parochial schools.'"
THE COURT & RELIGION
The Supreme Court has invalidated tax credits, tuition reim-
bursements and related plans providing state aid to nonpublic
schools in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,'6 Sloan v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130 (1974); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974); Plummer v. City of Columbus Ohio, 414 U.S. 2 (1973).
. 11. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); United States v.
Colandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
12. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Kaplan v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13. See The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions, supra note 6, at 2.
14. Mott & Edelstein, Church, State and Education: The Supreme Court
and Its Critics, 2 J. LAW & ED. 535 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mott &
Edelstein].
15. Marburger v. Public Funds for Public Schools, 94 S. Ct. 3163 (1974);
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
16. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See Comment Constitutional Law - Nonestab-
lishment of Religion Grants to Law Income Area Parochial School for Certain
Maintenance Costs and to Low Income Parochial School Parents as Partial
Reimbursement for Tuition Expenditures Violates Establishment Clause, But
Tax Credits for Tuition Payment to Such Schools are Constitutionally Per-
missible, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1081 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Grants to Low
Income Area Parochial Schools]; Kelley, Tax Credits and the Tests of Estab-
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Lemon,"' and Levitt v. Committe for Public Education' during
the 1972-1973 term. In the 1973-1974 term, the Supreme Court
in Wheeler v. Barrera," approved a court of appeal's decision
holding that a state board of education was not required to assign
teachers to parochial schools even though board assignments of
such special teachers to the public schools had been made under
terms of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
Then in Marburger v. Public Funds for Public Schools, 0 the Su-
preme Court affirmed, without hearing argument, a decision by
a three-judge federal district court" invalidating a statute which:
(a) reimbursed parents of students in private schools for money
spent for secular textbooks and supplies; and (b) provided in-
structional material and auxiliary services upon request to non-
public schools.
In these cases, as in the two parochiaid rulings in 1971,2 the
court reaffirmed a view of the establishment clause which has pre-
vailed throughout most of our history and which generally prohibits
governmental aid to private and parochial elementary and secondary
schools." Interestingly, the only decision on governmental aid to
parochial schools during Chief Justice Warren's tenure, Board
of Education v. Allen, " had gone the other way and was somewhat
supportive of such aid.
lishment, Supreme Court Decisions, 90 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1024-28 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Kelley]; Whelan, School Aid Decisions: Not Dead, But
Sleeping, 129 AMERiCA 6-8 (July 7, 1973) [hereinafter cited as School Aid De-
cisions].
17. 413 U.S. 825 (1973). See Brickman, The Supreme Court and the
Sectarian School, 102 INTELLECT 82-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brick-
man].
18. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
19. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
20. 94 S. Ct. 3163 (1974).
21. The significance of this decision was assessed in Pfeffer, Aid to
Parochial Schools: The Verge and Beyond, 3 J. LAW & ED. 115-21 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as The Verge and Beyond].
22. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This ease was decided to-
gether with No. 569, Early v. Di Censo.
23. See Brickman, supra note 17, at 82-84; Giannella, Lemon and Tilton:
The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REV.
147 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Giannella]; Morgan, supra note 7, at 57-97;
Note, Aid to Parochial Schools-Income Tax Credits, 56 MINN. L. REV. 189
(1971) (an evaluation of Minnesota's income tax credit after Lemon) [here-
inafter cited as Aid to Parochial Schools]; Pfeffer, The Parochiaid Decision,
60 TODAY'S ED., 63-64 (Sept., 1971) [hereinafter cited as The Parochiaid
Decision]; Whelan, Lessons from the School Aid Decisions, 125 AMERICA 32-33
(July 24, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Lessons from the School Aid Decisions].
24. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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It is important to reiterate that aid to parochial elementary
and secondary schools was a subject upon which President Nixon
had taken a strong and consistent position.25 He had, for example,
urged that a way be found within the Constitution to provide gov-
ernmental aid to parochial schools and had specifically endorsed a
tax credit plan.26 Nonetheless, two of the Nixon appointees, Justices
Powell' and Blackmun, voted against tax credits and all four of
his appointees condemned other forms of aid to parochial schools
in these cases.
The traditional conservative personnel bloc on the Court,
including Justices Powell, Blackmun, Burger, White and Rehn-
quist," has typically broken down on church-state issues especially
involving governmental aid to parochial schools." Of this bloc,
only Justices White and Rehnquist reveal a pattern of general
support for such aid, with the Chief Justice on occasion, but not
regularly, joining their position."' This is well illustrated by the
1972-1973 term, in which the Court handled an unusually large
number of cases involving first amendment rights and elections.
Of the thirty-four cases in this category, twenty-one were decided
against the right asserted. In the area of church and state, how-
ever, of the five cases handled, only two were decided against the
asserted right and one of these' dealt with a question of remedy
rather than substance. 2
Moreover, the other case involving a vote against the asserted
"establishment" right did not uphold aid to parochial elementary
and secondary schools, but rather sustained by a 6-3 vote the South
Carolina Higher Education Facilities Authority aiding institutions
25. See McWilliams, supra note 5, at 515-16; Shanahan, supra note 5,
at 85; Swomley, supra note 5, at 168-71.
26. See Exoerpts from the President's Special Message to Congress on
Education Reform, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1970, at 28; Nixon's Views, supra
note 5, at 97-98.
27. An analysis of Powell's stand is given in School Aid Decisions, supra
note 16, at 6-8. See also Kelley, supra note 16, at 1024-28.
28. See COMMISSION ON LAW, SOCIAL ACTION AND URBAN AFFAIRS OF
THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, THE CIvIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES DE-
CISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FOR THE 1972-73 TERM: A
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1973), at 99 [hereinafter cited as A SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS].
29. See Lessons from the School Aid Decisions, supra note 23, at 32-33.
30. See, e.g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1978).
81. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), where the Court ruled to
grant only prospective effect to a judgment declaring unconstitutional a law
providing aid to parochial schools.
32. See A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 28.
[Vol. 9
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of higher learning.33 Furthermore, Justice Brennan's dissent, con-
curred in by Justices Douglas and Marshall, did not view the pro-
gram so much as a prohibited establishment of religion, but rather
as an infringement of the college's freedom to engage in religious
activities and to offer religious instruction if it was to qualify
for assistance under the law. Indeed, Brennan argued, "the col-
lege turns over to the state authority control of substantial parts
of the fiscal operation of the school-its very lifeblood." Later,
however, he also concluded that the statute in question violated
the establishment clause as well."'
LEGAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES
In a discussion of the Burger Court's application of the estab-
lishment clause, it is important to recognize a difference in ap-
proach depending on whether or not the Court is dealing with
elementary and secondary schools or institutions of higher learning.
In 1973, the Court in Hunt v. McNair," accepted the constitutional
distinction between elementary and secondary schools on the one
hand, and colleges and universities on the other hand,36 which a
majority of the Warren Court had found invalid in Board of Edu-
cation v. Allen' (decided in 1968), and again in Tilton v. Rich-
ardson" (decided in 1971). In Tilton, Justice White speaking for
the five-man majority, with Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan
and Marshall dissenting, found no constitutionally significant
difference between college and elementary or secondary schools."9
Thus, Justice White upheld federal grants for sectarian college
buildings because he deemed them to be within the range of per-
missibility under the establishment clause when measured by a
single standard equally applicable to both types of private edu-
cational institutions."0 On the face of things, the liberal bloc of
dissenters in Tilton gathered support from several of the Nixon
appointees, while Justice White persisted in his dissent in McNair
with the views he expressed for the majority in Tilton two years
earlier.
33. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
34. Id. at 751.
35. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
36. See Brickman, eupra note 17, at 82-84.
37. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
38. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See Giannella, supra note 23, at 147.
39. Id.
40. For an excellent analysis of this point, see The Verge and Beyond,
aupra note 21, at 115-21.
19751
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In the last decade, the Court has not only developed a
rather consistent format of distinguishing between aid to paro-
chial schools and aid to church-supported colleges, but has also
formulated a view of general applicability involving constitutional
principles for such elementary and secondary schools.4 ' In 1968,
the Court in Allen," refused to take judicial notice of the nature,
functions and operations of parochial schools other than to acknowl-
edge that they serve the dual functions of secular and religious
instruction. These functions, the Court felt, in the absence of
contrary proof regarding specific schools, are separable. Since
then, however, in all but two cases"3 the Court has invalidated
parochial school aid statutes without the benefit of a trial record.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Court is now acting
upon the assumption that there are not sufficient differences
between parochial schools in the same or different states to require
case-by-case adjudication."4
41. The historical development of these applications of constitutional
principles is enumerated in Brickman, supra note 17, at 82-84; Giannella,
supra note 23, at 147; Grants to Low Income Area Parochial Schools, supra
note 16, at 1081-102; Haskell, The Prospects for Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 MINN. L. REv. 159 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Haskell]; Kelley,
supra note 16, at 1024-28; Morgan, supra note 7, at 57-97; Mott, supra note
14, at 535-91; Pollack, Parochiaid: End of the Line?, 62 TODAY'S ED. 77-79,
96 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pollack]; School Aid Decisions, supra note
16, at 6-8; Whelan, School Aid Decisions, 125 AMERICA 8-11 (July 10, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Whelan].
42. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
43. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413
U.S. 472 (1973); Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44. This point is also persuasively argued by Leo Pfeffer in The Verge
and Beyond, supra note 21, at 115-21. "[T]he Court correctly 'perceived that
the narrow interpretation of Lemon would effectively permit a state to finance
a system of church-related schools; that is, excessive entanglement." Grants
to Low Income Area Parochial Schools, supra note 16, at 1081-02.
Donald A. Giannella believes that the Court went beyond the bounds
of constitutionality by sanctioning the free loan of textbooks. That is, in
Everson, the Court stated that it had gone to the edge of constitutionality
in upholding busing for parochial school students. Giannella contends that in
Lemon the Court sought to scramble back, reaching out for any support it could
find on the constitutional landscape by adopting the "excessive entanglement"
notion. Giannella, supra note 23, at 147. Contrast these points with the state-
ment of William R. Consedine, General Counsel, at the U.S. Catholic Con-
ference in 1971: "Our job is to find out what else is permissible besides
buses, textlooks, tax-exemptions and college buildings." See also Whelan,
supra note 41, at 8-11.
[The] Court has not only taken a case-by-case approach to the ques-
tion of religion in the schools, but it has developed a more muddled
Lemon, the Court sought to scramble back reaching out for any support it could
position over the years in regard to setting a standard for measuring
[Vol. 9
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A very different course of action was followed by the Court
during this period regarding church-related colleges. For example,
in Tilton, Lemon, and Early v. DiCenso,"' the Court, in refusing to
invalidate the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, required
a trial record establishing in each case that the grant to each spe-
cific college would have as its primary effect the advancement of
religion or would involve excessive church-state entanglement.
Moreover, the same day that the Court struck down several
attempts to aid parochial elementary and secondary schools in
Nyquist, Sloan, and Levitt, it upheld a state statute authorizing
the issuance of bonds benefitting a Baptist-controlled college on
the grounds that the college had no significant sectarian orienta-
tion."6 The Court arrived at this conclusion partly because only
sixty percent of the student body were Baptists and the record
did not demonstrate that religion so permeated the college that
excessive entanglement would result from efforts to assure that the
facilities financed by the bonds would not be used for sectarian
purposes.
the amount and kind of permissible aid to religion. If one reads the
principles derived by Justice Black from the establishment structures
set forth in Everson alongside those suggested by Chief Justice Burger
in Walz and Lemon, it is apparent that some backsliding has taken
place. The Court seems determined to allow greater freedom of asso-
ciation between government and religion and in this sense, it is re-
sponding to increased complexities and costs in education. That it
does so by sacrificing clarity becomes evident when one notes that
in Nyquist Justice Powell states and applies the test set forth by the
Chief Justice in Lemon, but the Chief Justice himself dissents in
Nyquist. Unfortunately, as the barrier between church and state
becomes more vague, the decisions are less useful as predictive
devices for the lower courts and legislatures.
Mott & Edelstein, supra note 14, at 535. It has also been stated by S. H.
Pollack that,
[The] Court took pains to point out that the manner in which it re-
solved the tuition grant issue made it unnecessary to decide whether
the significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries
might differentiate the Nyquist and Lemon cases from a case involv-
ing some form of public assistance made available generally without
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian or public-nonpublic nature of the
institution benefitted.
Pollack, supra note 41, at 96. See also Brickman, supra note 17, at 82-84;
Haskell, supra note 41, at 159; Kelley, supra note 16, at 1024-28; Legal
Opinions on Parochiaid, 38 EDUCATION DIGEST 33 (Jan. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Legal Opinions on Parochiaid]; Morgan, supra note 7, at 57-97;
School Aid Decisions, supra note 16, at 6-8.
45. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). See The Verge and Beyond,
supra note 21, at 115-21. Compare Whelan, supra note 41, at 8-11, wherein
1975]
Boles: Burger Court and Parochial Schools
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
468 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
This dichotomy in judicial treatment of colleges as contrasted
to secondary and elementary schools should not go unrecognized
by legislative and educational policymakers. It has prompted
Leo Pfeffer to conclude that unless
there is a radical change in personnel, the Court is likely
to strike down on its face a statute providing aid to paroch-
ial elementary and secondary schools beyond the narrow
confines of bus transportation and strictly limited text-
book loans, but it will require a factual record to justify
invalidation of a law to aid church-related colleges and
universities."
The exquisite imaginativeness of legislative attempts to cir-
cumvent the Court's rubrics against aid to parochial schools can
be seen by surveying the cases involving such programs to come
before the Court in the five years since Allen. In that time span,
the Court was confronted by a dozen statutory variations of the
same parochial school aid theme in ten different cases. The Court,
in each of the cases, either definitively rejected the variations on
a theme, or in two cases indicated probable rejection. For example,
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,"' DiCenso, and Sanders v. Johnson,"9
the Tilton Court was viewed as holding that "small violations of the First
Amendment over a period of years are unconstitutional while a huge violation
occurring only once is de minimis." This contrast is the most dramatic and
revealing aspect of the school aid decisions.
It seems clear that Black, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall have taken
the position that all direct aid to church-related schools, at what-
ever level and in whatever form, is unconstitutional. No other mem-
ber of the Court was willing to adopt this simple but extreme
position.
Id.
47. The Verge and Beyond, supra note 21, at 121.
48. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Lessons From the School Aid Decisions,
supra note 23, at 32-33; The Parochiaid Decision, supra note 23, at 63-64;
Whelan, supra note 41, at 8-11. According to Whelan, both Douglas' and
Black's attitudes toward church-related schools are hostile, maintaining that
they exist for purpose of religious indoctrination and therefore cannot receive
governmert subsidy. Further, Whelan believes that the excessive entanglement
argument carried the day, and that the very restrictions on which the states
relied to guarantee the secularity of the program proved to be their undoing.
Whelan, Supreme Court Cases: Questions and Answers, 124 AMERICA 372-75
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Sunreme Court Cases].
Donald A. Giannella believes that the Court in Lemon has come up with
a set of opinions that lack cogency and rationality. Although a majority
of the Court is not willing to make a clear commitment, the Court may be, in
effect, staking out a limited cluster of child-benefit aids on a case-by-case basis
without attempting to delineate boundaries under that logically suspect
theory. Giannella's basic theory is that in the Allen case, the Court went over
[Vol. 9
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different types of aid in the form of salary payments to parochial
school teachers were struck down. Next, in Nyquist5 Sloan,'
and Essex v. Wolman,52 the Court did the same thing to varying
forms of tuition grants for parochial school pupils. Moreover, in
Nyquist, and Grit v. Wolman, 3 it ruled as unconstitutional laws pro-
viding tax benefits and tax credits for parochial school tuition.
Nyquist and Grit v. Wolmon, 3 it ruled as unconstitutional laws pro-
repair grants to parochial elementary and secondary schools, 4 while
in Levitt, it nullified grants to pay for legally mandated services
performed in such parochial schools. In Wheeler v. Barrera"
the Supreme Court affirmed a lower federal court's action holding
that a state was not required to assign teachers to parochial
schools under terms of the federal Elementary and Secondary Edu-
the verge of constitutionality and sanctioned the free loan of textbooks.
See note 44, eupra.
The author of Aid to Parochial Schools, supra note 23, at 189, analyzes the
1971 Minnesota legislature's enactment of a bill allowing parents of children
attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools during the tax year to
credit a portion of these educational costs against their state income tax. The
attempt to formulate standards such that the extent and intent of the aid was
well defined lead the author to conclude that such rigorous definition, albeit
well intended, would possibly render the plan unconstitutional.
Brickman sees in Lemon v. Kurtzman, one prophecy not explicitly stated
in the decision but clearly visible within the lines of the text: eventual dis-
appearance of sectarian schools, the monolithization of the United States
educational system and demise of divisiveness over public support to church-
related schools. Brickman, supra note 17, at 82-84. See also Schools Make
News; Parochial School Tangle; Supreme Court Decisions, 54 SATuRDAY RE-
viEW 48 (Aug. 21, 1971).
49. Sanders v. Johnson, 403 U.S. 955 (1971). See Supreme Court Cases,
upra note 52, at 372-75.
50. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
418 U.S. 756 (1973). See Grants to Low Income Area Parochial Schools,
upra note 16, at 1081-02. The author notes that the Nyquist Court used
the diversion of funds argument to strike down direct aid to parochial schools
although the Supreme Court has never accepted this argument as a readily-
identifiable indicator of an establishment clause violation.
51. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). See Brickman, supra note 17,
at 82-84. In Sloan, according to Brickman, the Court attributes the difficulties
faced by sectarian schools to virtual rigidity of the official interpretation
of the establishment clause which orders that Congress and the states by
reason of the fourteenth amendment, "shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion." It may be inferred that the Court is calling atten-
tion to the process of amending the Constitution.
52. 409 U.S. 808 (1973).
53. 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
54. The Nyquiet Court emphasized that maintenance services, although
they are secular by nature, nonetheless contribute to the religious mission
of the schools.
55. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
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cation Act even if it assigned them to public schools, since the
requirement of comparable programs did not mean identical ones.
The Court has suggested that even governmental programs
providing textbooks to parochial schools are not totally above
reproach, despite Allen, as indicated by two procedural moves re-
cently taken. In Donahey v. Protestants and others,56 it denied a
petition for certiorari to review a court of appeals' decision ' hold-
ing that a substantial federal question requiring the convening of a
three-judge court was presented in an attack upon Title II (the
textbook section) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965. Of even greater potential significance was the Court's
action last term in the Marburger case, where it affirmed, without
hearing argument, a federal district court's decision invalidating
a New Jersey statute authorizing funding for textbooks, "supplies,
instructional materials, equipment and auxiliary services" to pa-
rochial schools as they requested them.
The procedures leading to the Supreme Court's final disposi-
tion of the case are themselves instructive. In May of 1973, one
month after the action of the federal district court invalidating the
law, New Jersey filed a notice of appeal and obtained a stay of
the injunction from the Supreme Court. On June 25, 1973, the
same day that the Court decided Nyquist, Sloan, and Levitt, the
Court vacated the stay and reinstated the inj unction.5"
STATE EVASIVE ACTIONS
The significance of this unusual move has been examined by
at least one writer. Shortly after the Court's action, Leo Pfeffer
observed that this was not an ordinary vacatur.5 In earlier cases,
such as DiCenso, the Court did not vacate the stay until it affirmed
the judgment. In Marburger, however, the appeal was at that time
still pending and undetermined, and the vacatur was sua sponte,
itself a rare practice. Moreover, the three dissenting Justices in
Marburger, Burger, White and Rehnquist, also dissented in Nyquist
and Sloan, and gave as their reasons for objecting to the vacatur
the "reasons stated in the dissenting opinions" in Nyquist and
Sloan. Thus, there appears to be a more substantive quality to the
Court's action than such superficially procedural action might sug-
gest. The message which the Court may very well be attempting
56. 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
57. P.O.A.U.C.S. v. United States, 435 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1971).
58. 93 S. Ct. 3024 (1973).
59. See The Verge and Beyond, supra note 21, at 117-18.
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to convey by this action is that the New Jersey statute was un-
constitutional on its face for the reasons noted in Nyquist and
Sloan.
If this is, in fact, what the Court was attempting, it is an
approach likely brought on by the political and religious stratagems
that have developed in some states as a subterfuge to avert the
thrust of the Supreme Court's decisions effectively rejecting gov-
ernmental aid to parochial schools. The pattern of state action
easily observable is this:
Pass a law aiding parochial schools and fund it as soon as
possible. When the law is declared unconstitutional, enact
a new one with some variation and again begin immediate
funding. The same basic plan can thus continue indefin-
itely so long as the ingenuity of legislatures and church
lobbyists hold out and recoupment of state funds already
expended is not energetically sought by the governments
who had illegally expended them. °
Examples of states subverting the Supreme Court decisions
invalidating laws supporting parochial education are the rule rather
than the exception." After the Court had struck down the Rhode
Island 'and Connecticut statutes in DiCenso and Sanders, the Attor-
neys General of the two states gave up, as not worthwhile, any
attempt to recoup payments made under the invalidated laws. In
Pennsylvania, the state itself obtained from the federal district
court a ruling to the effect that the Lemon decision was not to be
applied retroactively; therefore, funds already appropriated could
be paid to the parochial schools. This order was later affirmed by
the Supreme Court.6" Even in Marburger, the Supreme Court, by
granting the stay originally, allowed the states to resume funding
under the law in question.
It is in this context one must view the importance of the sua
sponte vacatur of the Court's stay in Marburger. To at least one
60. Id. at 116.
61. See Latest Blow to Tax Support for Private Schools, 73 U.S. NEws
AND WORLD REPORT 83 (Oct. 23, 1972). Latest ruling of the Court in an
Ohio case providing reimbursement for tuition outlays was ruled unconsti-
tutional. This was the third time within a year the Supreme Court turned
down plans by states to aid parochial schools. The Ohio court decision was
made without written decision and under the rationale that "one may not do
by indirection what is forbidden directly" in regard to application of the
establishment of religion.
62. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See The Verge and Be-
yond, supra note 21, at 116-21.
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observer, the action constituted an emphatic declaration that the
Court would no longer acquiesce in this game of not too subtle
subversion of constitutional principles.63 Additional evidence is
found in subsequent action involving Marburger; for when New
Jersey filed an appeal for a stay from the district court's refusal to
permit continued payment to vendors for supplies, instructional
material and equipment pending appeal, it was directed first to
Justice Brennan and later to the Chief Justice. Both Justices denied
the application for a stay, thereby requiring the immediate
transfer back to the state of all supplies, instructional material and
equipment delivered to the parochial schools even before the suit
was started and forbidding the state to pay for supplies, equipment
and the like, while the preliminary injunction was stayed.
Today, if one approaches the problem of governmental aid to
parochial schools strictly from a legal or procedural standpoint, it
seems such programs aimed at elementary and secondary schools
have just about exhausted constitutional alternatives, so far as the
Court is concerned. Justice White, of course, continues to dissent
from the general principle announced in recent years; and the
Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist continue in their enchantment
with attempts to draw a line between direct and indirect benefits
to parochial schools. The Chief Justice, however, insisted in his
opinion for the Court in Levitt, that all of the principles of Nyquist6"
and Sloan are binding upon the Court. Thus, for the foreseeable
future, a significant majority of the Court appears committed to a
constitutional interpretation that prohibits aid to parochial ele-
mentary and secondary schools going beyond the precise confines of
Everson v. Board of Education"5 and Allen. From a practical stand-
point, this means that there is little likelihood that the Court will
uphold any one of several voucher system plans (intellectually
63. The Verge and Beyond, supra note 21, at 118-19.
64. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1978). See School Aid Decisions, supra note 16, at 6-8. Nyquist,
Sloan and Levitt, saw the Court add five more programs to the casualty list
including: tax credits, cash reimbursements, and direct payment for man-
dated services and maintenance of health and safety facilities. The primary
argument on which the Court has rested the invalidation is the primary
effect of aiding religion. Justice Powell explicitly and repeatedly rejects the
contention that any law whatsoever that results in aid to church-related
schools is automatically unconstitutional. He states that there is a "narrow
channel" between the Scylla and Charybdis of effect and entanglement.
Mutch, Crucial Juncture for Parochiaid, 90 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 454 (April
18, 1973); Morgan, eupra note 7, at 57-97.
65. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Supreme Court Cases, supra note 52, at
372-75.
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fashionable in some circles) under which vouchers could be used
for parochial school attendance." The fact that under some pro-
posals the vouchers would also be available for public and non-
sectarian private schools, would not help clear the constitu-
tional hurdles established by the Court in Sloan or Levitt, let alone
the technique utilized to dispose of the maintenance and repair
provisions of the New York law in Nyquist.'7
THE POLITICS OF THE CONTROVERSY
This does not mean that proponents of parochial school aid will
cease their efforts within the political arena to find a flaw in the
66. C.M. Whelan, in School Aid Decisions, supra note 16, at 8-11, sees
comfort in the fact that five justices of the Court have deliberately left the
door open for further consideration of the constitutionality of many other
types of public assistance programs. He suggests that four criteria delineate
potentially acceptable types of public assistance to parochial schools. They
are: (1) all school children must participate, (2) aid must be in the form
of secular services or materials, (3) no day-to-day decisions between secular
and religious educators are required, and (4) there is no need for the school
to sacrifice independence in religious matters. Under Whelan's criteria,
vouchers might pass as constitutional. Cf. Maurice R. Berube, The Trouble
with Vouchers, 93 COMMONWEAL 414-17 (Jan. 29, 1971). Berube feels that
vouchers are based on a remarkably naive strategy of the assessment of
educational politics, which sees that there are no irreconcilable forces in
American education. This simply is not true according to Berube. Rather,
there are many problems that prevent vouchers from being an easily and
readily accepted option. See also Bartell, Pro and Con of Public Funding for
Catholic Schools, 63 CURRENT HisToRY 62-67, 87-88 (Aug. 1972) [here-
inafter cited as Bartell]; Frey, Parochiaid: Economic Tales and Realities, 90
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 366-88 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Frey].
Irving Spiegel states that the National Jewish Community Relations Ad-
visory Council sees purchase of secular services via vouchers as incompatible
with the oft-repeated argument of parochial school advocates in support of
their refusal to send their children to public schools, that religion is imminent
in life and cannot be divorced from education. Spiegel, Jewish Group Sees
a Drive for Public Aid to Church Schools, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1970, at 29.
Francis S. Overlan has written,
With regard to any new and imaginative proposals that would bring
public money to large numbers of privately managed schools, one can
almost predict that solutions that have political attractiveness will
be constitutionally flawed and that those solutions that are consti-
tutionally acceptable will be politically unattractive.
Overlan, Our Public School Monopoly, 169 NEw RnPUBLIC 14-18 (Sept.
15, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Our Public School Monopoly].
67. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Edu-
cation and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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Court's constitutional armor." Indeed, one of the problems has been
that some politicians believe that total and unquestioning sponsor-
ship and support of broad programs of aid to parochial schools is
such good politics that their public pronouncements go much
further than thoughtful and realistic parochial educational admin-
istrators would ever go. Indeed, in their fervor, some political types
have pushed programs that parochial school administrators felt
were counter-productive to their own system. For example, Presi-
dent Nixon in August of 1971, in a speech to the Knights of
Columbus, departed from his prepared text to pledge support for
Roman Catholic schools since he viewed it as a "tragedy" that
one Catholic school closes down each day. "We must," said Nixon,
68. See Current Comments: NCEA on Supreme Court Decisions, 129
AMERICA 79 (Aug. 18, 1973). CREDIT (Citizens Relief for Education by
Income Tax) has been shaken but not shattered and will continue the organi-
zation for some time. The president of CREDIT remarks,
[I]f the short term goal of CREDIT to secure a federal tax credit
bill is somewhat set back by the decision [Nyquist], the long-range
goal of equitable treatment for nonpublic school parents continues un-
daunted. CREDIT will continue to explore every avenue of assist-
ance to parents and children in nonpublic schools and will not rest
until a reversal of this odious decision is achieved either de jure
in the courts or de facto in the legislature.
Id.; Mott & Edelstein, supra note 14, at 535-91. See also Buder, School Board
Candidates Stress Need for Change, N.Y. Times, March 14, 1970, at 16;
Buder, Voter Turnout is 14.5 Percent for City School Election, N.Y. Times,
March 23, 1970, at 1; Lyman, Maintaining a Pluralistic Society, 184 SCIENCE
855 (May 24, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Maintaining a Pluralistic Society];
Overlan, Why Are Parochial Schools Closing, 131 AMERICA 111-13 (Sept.
14, 1974).
W.W. Brickman infers from the Court's decision in Sloan v. Lemon
that a campaign might be undertaken to clarify the wording of the first
amendment so as to ensure the existence of sectarian schools, along with
definite safeguards of the freedom of religion such that "excessive entangle-
ment" would be eliminated as a judicial argument. This inference followed
the Court's attribution (in Sloan) of difficulties faced by sectarian schools
to virtual rigidity of the official interpretation of the establishment clause
which orders that Congress and the states by reason of the fourteenth amend-
ment "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Brickman,
supra note 17, at 82-84.
T.R. Mulaney thinks that political realities suggest that pressure by
Catholics upon politicians in predominantly Catholic areas with the backing
of candidates who support parochiaid could have a significant effect on
government support of such a program. Catholics feel that they can muster
support behind the tax credit scheme since the political support of candi-
dates in predominantly Catholic areas will aid them through willingness of
Congressmen to see their cause in return for support. Mulany, Tax Credits
and Parochial Schools, 98 COMMONWEAL 185-88 (April 27, 1973) [herein-
after cited as Mulaney].
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"resolve to stop that trend and turn it around. You can count on
my support to do that." '6 9 This rhetoric not only astonished the
Knights of Columbus, but unsettled his staff, including U.S.
Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland, who observed that
he knew of no legal way to allocate public funds directly to
parochial schools or to the parents of pupils who attend them. 0
Undaunted by law, fact or educational reality, President Nixon
renewed his pledge for such aid on April 6, 1972, to the National
Catholic Education Association, although there he acknowledged
that finding the constitutional means to accomplish this goal would
take time. Speaking in terms more in keeping with a convention of
the National Association of Manufacturers than of an educational
association, he attacked the public school philosophy by noting
that, "No single school system . . . must ever gain an absolute
monopoly... it would lack altogether the essential spur of compe-
tition to innovate, grow and reform."" Leaving aside for a moment
the fact that competition may not be the central concern for an
educational system, Nixon continued to contribute to the myth that
federal funds will solve all the problems of parochial schools and
even more unfortunately, that such money can be delivered.
Although President Nixon was bewailing the "tragedy" that
one Catholic school closes each day, Louis R. Gary, former Chairman
of Cardinal Spellman's Committee on Educational Research and a
Consultant to President Nixon's Commission on School Finance and
his colleague, K. C. Cole, author of the Fleischman Commission
Report on Education in New York State, point out the fact that
enrollment in Roman Catholic parochial schools will drop forty-two
percent this decade whether or not new money is found. "In fact,"
they write, "the consolidation program needed to keep the Catholic
school system alive would involve closing two or three schools a
day," not one as Nixon found upsetting. 2 Indeed, Gary and Cole
argue that many Catholic bishops would welcome a government
order to consolidate their schools since they have agreed privately
that consolidation is necessary, but they are reluctant to initiate it
themselves. Their reluctance stems from the bishops' belief that
"many parishioners simply would ignore any church order to close
their beloved-and inefficient-schools. .. ."
69. Gary and Cole, Politics of Aid-and a Proposal for Reform, 55
SATURDAY REv. 31-33 (July 22, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Gary and Cole].
70. Id.
71. Nixon's Views, supra note 5, at 97-98 (emphasis added). See Nixon
Rapped for Parochiaid Stand, 89 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 507 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Nixon Rapped].
72. Gary and Cole, supra note 69, at 33.
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President Nixon and a host of other politicians have been
ensnared in a web of false and mischievous assumptions regarding
the realities of parochial elementary and secondary education, as a
variety of writers both within and outside the parochial school
establishment have demonstrated."3 Moreover, such politicians have
acted on these inaccuracies to seek to enhance their political
fortunes, thereby, giving false strength to a variety of myths that
continue to persist. The underlying assumption causing an array
of mischievous misconceptions runs that if the government can
give aid to Catholic parochial elementary and secondary schools,
tuition will stop rising and if tuition stops rising, enrollment will
stop falling. This is a seductive proposition which is, by and large,
untrue.
ECONOMICS & PAROCHIAL SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
In fact, tuition in most Catholic schools has been so low-in
1970, the average yearly tuition in U.S. Catholic elementary schools
was only $42-that it could not be a significant cause for enrollment
decline. While the average tuition cost jumped to $120 in 1971,
enrollments had been dropping for more than a decade. 4 Some
might argue that even a modest tuition could prove unbearable for
families in the inner-city, thus forcing such families to withdraw
their children from parochial schools. In fact, however, Catholic
parochial school enrollment is dropping even faster in the affluent
suburbs. Thus, the very families who can most afford the tuition
are the ones most rapidly shifting their children out of the church
schools. A further dramatization of this verity is the startling fact
that in New York State fully one-third of the Catholic elementary
schools that closed within the last five years charged no tuition at
all. 5 To put these matters in perhaps even a sharper perspective,
the New York study found that Roman Catholics there contributed
only 2.5 percent of their income to their parish including all school
tuition and fees."
It seems obvious that a key reason for the drop in Catholic
parochial school enrollment is that parents, for a variety of reasons
not including tuition costs, are choosing not to send their children
to church-supported schools. Catholic schools are caught in the
73. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 5, at 515-16; Swomley, supr
note 5, at 168-71.
74. Gary and Cole, aupra note 69, at 32.
75. Id. at 33.
76. Swomley, upra note 5, at 168-71.
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ideological conflicts found within the church itself. Thus, liberal
parents believe that Catholic school teaching is too restrictive,"'
while conservative parents are upset with what they regard as the
new permissiveness and lack of fidelity to classic Roman Catholic
dogma.'"
One writer in a Roman Catholic periodical argues that much of
the legal and political resistence to governmental aid to Catholic
parochial schools arises because of their totalitarian, as well as
sectarian, image. This image conflicts with the historically pro-
fessed desire of the American society for not only secular but
"liberative" schools. He suggests that if Catholic schools were
more directly controlled by parents through elective trustees and
more responsive to students' needs and goals, the secular state
would have less reason to fear the spectre of a creeping church
state."' This emphasizes the quixotic quality of a phenomenon of
the last decade where writers in some traditionally chic liberal
periodicals have argued nostalgically for greater support for Cath-
olic parochial schools because of some mistily perceived libertarian-
ism which pervaded them. °
Of course, conservative Roman Catholics are quick to point out
that if their schools become largely secular to meet the requirements
of law or political and educational theory, there is little or no reason
to distinguish them from the public schools, or to justify their
separate existence.8' It cannot be denied that many Catholic schools
are, in fact, losing their distinctiveness because of the increasing
number of lay teachers replacing the traditional nuns or brothers.
The classroom clearly has a less religious aura. Beside the obvious
problem of psychological distinctiveness, the development entails
an economic problem of at least equal importance. The presence of
77. Note examples of liberal Catholic thought, i.e., Luettgen, Church
Schools in the American Secular State, 126 AMERICA 567-69 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Luettgen].
78. Id.
79. Id. at 168-69.
80. See, e.g., C. GREER, COBWER ATTITuDEs: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION AND CULTURE (1970); Arons, The Joker in Private School Aid,
54 SATURDAY Rsv. 45-47 (Jan. 16, 1971); Greer, Public Schools:The Myth of
the Melting Pot, SATURDAY Rnv. 84 (Nov. 15, 1969); Levin, Aid to Parochial
Schools: The Case for Tax Credits, 167 NEw RLEPUBLc 16-19 (Oct. 21, 1972);
Walinsky, Aid to Parochial Schools: Liberating Ourselves from Deadly Dogma,
167 NEw REPtBI~c 18-21 (Oct. 7, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Walinsky].
81. See Current Comment: High Price of Free Exercises, 125 AMERICA
360-61 (Nov. 6, 1971); Maintaining a Pluralistic Society, supra note 68, at
855; Mott & Edelstein, supra note 14, at 535-91; Lessons from the School
Aid Decisions, supra note 23, at 32-33.
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religious-order teachers represents a major subsidy to the school
since, on a national average, religious-order teachers receive
stipends and room and board worth $2,550 for teaching in Catholic
schools as contrasted with the average salary of $5,597 paid to
laymen in the same schools.2
Even at the highest point of Catholic school enrollment in
1962, these schools only educated one-half of America's school-age
Catholic population. In 1970, less than thirty-three percent of that
group was enrolled in parochial schools, while estimates for 1975-
1976 suggest this number will drop to twenty-two percent.8 3 Yet,
despite the often voiced concern about the spiritual well-being of
Catholic children not attending parochial schools, the Roman
Catholic church's financial priorities have not been altered to take
into account the spiritual educational problems of the approximately
two-thirds Catholic school population attending the public schools.
For example, the Jesuit journal AMERICA pointed out that only four
percent of the Catholic church's educational funds go to the 7.6
million Catholic children attending public schools, while ninety-
six percent of these funds go to the less than 4.4 million children
in parochial schools. 4 Referring to the Report of the Catholic
Church's National Association of Laity, which concluded that the
church's educational resources of manpower and dollars are badly,
if not to say unjustly, distributed, AMERICA'S point suggests that a
national program to provide parochial schools for all Roman Catho-
lics is neither realistic nor economically feasible, even if tax sup-
ported. This, it is argued, is especially true in rural areas.8
In some semi-rural areas with substantial Protestant popula-
tions, such as Iowa, Catholic parochial school systems have begun
to place advertisements in the local mass media in the hopes of
attracting new students. 6 The advertising effort is being aimed at
both Catholic families and the much larger number of Protestant
families with students presently attending the public schools. As
James B. Schneider, administrator of the Keokuk, Iowa, Roman
Catholic school system, explains the advertising campaign, "We
82. Gary and Cole, supra note 69, at 32.
83. Id. See Our Public School Monopoly, supra note 66, at 14-18. See
also Bartell, supra note 66, at 62.
84. Current Comment: Parochial Schools Challenged Again, 126 AMER-
ICA 275-76 (March 18, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Current Comment].
85. This point is enlarged upon in FR. O'NEALL, NEW SCHOOLS IN A
NEW CHURCH (1971). See Current Comment, supra note 95, at 275-76.
86. See, e.g., Parochial Schools Advertise for Pupils, Des Moines Regis-
ter, Jan. 26, 1975.
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are . . . extending the private school advantage to the people of
Keokuk and of the tri-state area, and are telling them their chil-
dren are welcome here." One of the advertisements approaches the
subject in this way:
The purpose of the Catholic school system is not to convert
non-Catholics. And the advantages of learning in a Chris-
tian atmosphere are not limited to Catholic children. The
philosophy is one of striving to educate the whole indi-
vidual, incorporating the most important training-
religious and moral-with the intellectual, social, emo-
tional and physical."'
While the response to the ads has been "good," Mr. Schneider said
that no new students have yet been enrolled. The rates for Catholic
families range from a low of $75 a year for one elementary student,
to a maximum of $325 a year for three or more high school students.
Non-Catholic families are charged an additional $50 a year in this
parochial school system.
There is an important parallel development occuring in the
United States alongside the well-recognized drop in enrollment in
Roman Catholic parochial schools. Although seldom recognized, it
is the sharp increase in the enrollment in non-Catholic, church-
related schools.88 A contemporary study reveals that during a
recent period, enrollment in Catholic schools decreased by seventeen
percent. At the same time, other church-related schools were experi-
encing an increase of sixty-six percent in enrollment. Part of this
growth is explained by the desire of the middle class white Protest-
ant parents to remove their children from the effects of racial
mixing in the public schools in the South and elsewhere.
Thus, it is erroneous to refer to attempts by Mr. Nixon, and
others of a similar stripe, to push aid to private schools prior to
the elections of 1972 as "the Catholic strategy."' It must be more
accurately seen as a Catholic-Southern strategy in which he sought
capture of the electoral votes of the South in addition to 202 elec-
87. Id. See Schools Make News: Church and State United, 54 SATUR-
DAY REv. 52 (Jan. 16, 1971).
88. See Boom in Protestant Schools: Reasons for a Sudden, Nationwide
Rise, 75 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT 44-66 (Oct. 8, 1973).
89. Mulaney, supra note 68, at 185-88.
90. Nixon Rapped, supra note 71, at 507; Swomley, supra note 5, at
168-71.
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toral votes of the seven states"' where Nixon claimed seventy
percent of the financial burden would fall if Catholic schools would
close. As W. Barry Garrett, Head of the Washington Bureau of the
Baptist Press explained, "With political support for the President
running strong in non-Catholic states, it is little wonder he is
focusing major attention on capturing Catholic support this
year.M
2
One Black leader saw through Nixon's tactic and commented
bitterly that "rather than using these (federal) funds for desegre-
gation achieved through bussing.., he has subtly joined Catholic
aspirations with his own political ambitions of satisfying racist,
white Americans."9 Carey McWilliams was also to observe that
direct federal aid to nonpublic schools is now deeply colored by
racial bias in the South and class bias generally, since the tax credit
plan will prove advantageous to the well-to-do and of little benefit
to poor families."
THE POLITICS OF UNREALITY
There certainly seems ample grounds to question the intentions
of President Nixon and other officials such as then-Governor
Rockefeller " to search for objective answers to the constitutional
and economic problems confronting parochial schools during this
time. Both Nixon and Rockefeller ignored the findings of Rocke-
feller's own Fleischman Report on Education in New York which
showed that only a few Catholic parochial schools closed for lack
of funds, and that the decline in enrollment in Catholic elementary
91. These states are California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
New Jersey and Michigan. For the need of Catholics to become politically
active on the subject, see School Aid: Shift to Politics, 124 AMERICA 364-65
(April 10, 1971).
92. Nixon Rapped, supra note 71, at 507.
93. Swomley, supra note 5, at 170.
94. McWilliams, supra note 5, at 515-16. See Walinsky, supra note 80, at
18-21.
95. For a discussion of Rockefeller's contribution to the rhetoric obscur-
ing the real solutions to the problems of Catholic schools in the future, see
Gary and Cole, supra note 69, at 33, explaining how he told Catholic leaders
his Commission would come out in support of aid. The majority report came out
against such aid. See Maskowitz, Public Funds and Private Schools, 68 PTA
MAGAZINE 16-19 (May, 1974). "As to public support, a gently public school
monopoly is welcome by almost all American parents as verified by Gallup in
1969 and by Harris in 1970." Obviously this conclusion does not square with
rhetoric of school reformers who build their proposals for educational im-
provement on the presumption of general citizen content with public edu-
cation.
(Vol. 9
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 [1975], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss3/1
THE BURGER COURT
schools was also not primarily traceable to rising costs." Indeed,
some studies showed that at best 25 percent of the enrollment
decline could be traced to cost."
At this time, Governor Ray of Iowa, a Republican, was also
campaigning for more assistance to parochial schools on the grounds
that if they closed, the public schools would be overcrowded, despite
the findings of his own Office of Planning and Programming. This
Iowa study notes:
[The] impact on the (public school) facilities of additional
students from closed nonpublic schools would be a tem-
porary one and would require additional school construc-
tion in only those districts with extremely high, 20 percent
or more, numbers of nonpublic school students. The long-
run effect would be absorbed in the natural replacement of
school facilities.9 8
This study demonstrated the fallacy of providing services such as
transportation, shared time, and auxiliary services to parochial
schools to relieve excessive burdens on the public schools, since
in fact the existing public school facilities were under-utilized.
That the political rhetoric of unreality continues is revealed by
comments in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT following the decisions
of the Supreme Court in 1973 unfavorable to aid to parochial
schools. The comment deplores the Court's action because the im-
pact will be to cause sharp cutbacks in Catholic education with a
big shift of students to the "already overcrowded public schools."
The sharp declines in public school enrollment resulting from de-
clining birthrates is completely ignored here as it is by Governor
Gilligan of Ohio who saw the Court's action as causing a "hardship,
not only for private schools, their students and families, but for
the whole public education system as well.""
Even more disturbing than this rather casual attitude of brush-
ing aside demographic and economic facts is the almost systematic
attempt to expunge research findings by President Nixon's Com-
mission on School Finance or at least by the President's speech
writers. For example, a research report compiled by faculty mem-
96. Swomley, supra note 5, at 170.
97. See Bartell, supra note 66, at 67.
98. Hullander, Marginal Cost Analysis of Selected Plans for State Aid
to Nonpublic Schools (State of Iowa, Office of Planning and Programming,
Mimeo, Aug., 1971).
99. Aid to Parochial Schools Coming to a Halt?, 75 U.S. NEWS AND
WoRLD REPORT, 27-28 (July 9, 1973).
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bers of Boston College and the University of Chicago was submitted
to the Commission. The Commission concluded that not one of the
recent analyses of the relationship between enrollment and tuition
levels has produced evidence that parents are taking their children
from nonpublic schools primarily because of increased costs. The
Commission did not, however, include the study or its findings in
its report.' 0
Moreover, at the request of the President's Commission, legal
memorandums were prepared for it by the eminent constitutional
authority, Paul A. Freund of Harvard and the Catholic legal
scholar, Charles M. Whelan of Fordham. Both memos, which were
denied general circulation, expressed the view that virtually all
discernible proposals for governmental aid to church schools are
probably unconstitutional. These included purchases of secular
services, salary supplements to parochial school teachers, vouchers,
tuition reimbursement and tax credits to parents of parochial
school students.'
Moreover, Freund posed an additional constitutional problem
confronting such programs growing out of a potential application
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. That is, if a church school
receives some public aid, does this not convert it to a publicly-
supported institution subject to the same standards and require-
ments, such as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, as other public institutions? Freund finally called attention
to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in DiCenso where he
stressed that if governmental aid to parochial schools were per-
mitted, "At some point the (church) school becomes public for
more purposes than the church could wish."' °2 This prompted
Justice Brennan to observe, "The church may justifiably feel that
its victory on the Establishment Clause has meant abandonment
of the Free Exercise Clause."'0°
One of the more significant phenomenons of the last decade
has been the wide disparity between what many American elected
officials think their constituents want and what, in fact, the
people truly want. The Watergate-impeachment-pardon syn-
100. Swomley, supra note 5, at 170.
101. Professor Whelan suggested that programs providing busing,
textbooks, health services and lunches might be upheld. He also listed record-
keeping functions and testing services required by statute which might be
acceptable, but these have recently been invalidated by a federal district
court. See Legal Opinions on Parochiaid, 8upra note 44, at 33.
102. 403 U.S. at 652, citing Early v. DiCenso, 316 F. Supp. at 121-22.
103. Id. See also Legal Opinions on Parochiaid, supra note 44, at 33.
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drome with the subsequent reaction in the polls and the elections
of 1972 is but one of the more obvious examples. Many politicians
entertain similar misconceptions regarding the people's opposition
to the public schools and their support of aid to parochial schools.
Here, as in other areas, President Nixon misread the American
mind and failed to recognize that a gentle public school monopoly
is welcomed by most American parents, as verified by a Gallup
poll in 1969 and by a similar poll by Harris in 1970. °" Moreover,
these surveys reveal that when children do poorly in the public
schools, it is the home conditions and general environment that is
blamed by the respondents rather than the public school system.
That such support existed during the last decade is, in itself, a
mark of the basic support for the public schools, since the climate
has seldom been more ripe for such attack upon public education.
Certainly there was no shortage of criticism coming from such
diverse forces as right-wing conservatives on the one extreme and
the new left on the other. It came also from segregationists and at
the same time from racial minorities and the poor, in addition to
some supporters of Catholic parochial schools.' 5 Yet, the percentage
of American youngsters enrolled in the public school continued to
grow. In 1960, 86 out of every 100 children attended the public
schools; in 1970, this number had grown to 89 students out of
100; and the U.S. Office of Education projects that by 1980, 91
out of 100 students will be in the public schools. This trend has
prompted one writer to conclude that "private schools are an
endangered species."'0 6
Thus, we are dealing with the fundamental relationship of
public schools to private and parochial schools, not just with the
use of public funds for private schools. Only recently have the
realities inherent in the knotty questions been faced by educators,
lawyers and policymakers. °7 This is why it is essential to move
beyond the sometimes sterile legal arena and to consider questions
involving the very practical economic and social effects of pro-
grams designed to provide public funds for private education. The
enormity of the American educational enterprise, both public and
104. For a more detailed analysis of these polls see Our Public School
Monopoly, supra note 66, at 14-18.
105. For a discussion of the diversity of the attacks on the public schools
see Frey, supra note 66, at 366-68.
106. Our Public School Monopoly, supra note 66, at 15.
107. See, e.g., Address by Herman Goldman, Associate Commissioner for
Equal Educational Opportunities, U.S. Office of Education and the National
Education Association.
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private, can only be appreciated if it is understood that in 1971,
more than sixty-three million Americans were full-time students,
teachers or administrators in the nation's educational superstruc-
ture. 108 In addition, 137,000 persons made education a time-con-
suming avocation as trustees of local school systems, state boards
of education, or institutions of higher learning.
While opponents from both the right and left political wings
may appear to be making short-range political capital by attacking
the foundations of the American educational system, they are
striking at a formidable force. This in no way implies that the
American public educational system is or should be above criti-
cism, deserved or otherwise. What it is meant to suggest is that
politicians and others, when attacking the system of democratic
public education, do so at considerable long-run political peril.
This also helps explain why, despite the hue and cry for a consti-
tutional amendment to permit parochiaid programs after the Su-
preme Court laid them to rest in its 1973 decisions, some scientifi-
cally-sampled public opinion polls revealed opposition to parochiaid
by a ratio of sixty percent opposed to forty percent in favor."9
CONCLUSION
It is, of course, impossible to formulate a conclusion for such
a volatile problem, involving as it does the seamless web of law,
politics, religious and educational philosophy and economics. At
best one can merely note where things appear to stand, and what
may be some of the more obvious future trends. It would be, how-
ever, blindly optimistic to expect any quick or totally harmonious
solutions to a debate as fundamental as this.
It does seem relatively safe to suggest that, so far as the
constitutional aspect of the controversy is concerned, the Supreme
Court for the foreseeable future will probably invalidate on its
face any statute providing aid to parochial elementary and secon-
dary schools which goes beyond the tightly circumscribed areas of
bus transportation and restricted textbook loans. Such a strict
constitutional approach will probably not be applied to colleges
and universities, however. This is, of course, predicated on the
assumption that there will be no major change in Court personnel
and that no stark change in judicial attitude occurs. Moreover,
108. For a detailed breakdown see SATURDAY REV. 68 (Dec. 8, 1971).
109. For a discussion of this and related matters see Doerr, Parochiaid
in the Courts Today, 38 EDUCATioN DIGEST 33 (March, 1973).
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a survey of the literature suggests a grudging acceptance of the
fundamental unconstitutionality of general parochiaid programs
by many supporters of the parochial school system.
This in no way is meant to suggest a disappearance or even a
diminution of fundamental theoretical debates in the area. It
should be stressed that the philosophical differences between the
various groups involved in this dispute are of such magnitude that
often no amount of goodwill can compromise them so long as the
parties continue to take their traditional ideology seriously. No
matter how one faces the situation or how carefully it is analyzed,
one thing remains clear: Roman Catholics generally take a favor-
able view of cooperative relations between government and religious
institutions, whereas Protestants and secularists do not. This
is illustrated by the Roman Catholic legal theologian Norman St.
John-Stevas, who demonstrates beyond a doubt the contradictions
between the Roman Catholic and Protestant position concerning
the nature of the state, when he writes:
The Catholic starts with the conception of the good but
damaged natural man; the Protestant with an idea of man
utterly corrupted by the Fall. For the Catholic the state
would have been necesary for man had he remained a
perfect being; for the Protestant it is the direct result of
original sin. For Luther the world was sin and the devil its
landlord. The employment of (state) power to further
social and religious ends seems reasonable to Catholics,
but Protestants, at least in theory, are distrustful of all
worldly power, as contaminated by sin."'
A more immediate reason for much of the heat in contemporary
debates over aid to private schools has been the actions of some
politicians who have sought to utilize the controversy for what
appears to be their private political ends. In so doing, they have
ignored the economic and educational realities, frequently pushing
the cause of parochial schools far beyond a point that would be
acceptable even to the administrators of such programs themselves.
In so doing, these politicians not infrequently play upon some of
the less noble spirits of their constituents of all persuasions, and
make rational decision-making leading to an equitable settlement
of some of these problems more difficult. Such political stratagems
are likely to continue until intellectual leaders on all sides of the
issue openly reject the emotionalism inherent in such appeals.
110. N. ST. JOHN STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAw 31 (1964).
19751
Boles: Burger Court and Parochial Schools
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
486 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Demographic trends suggest that the decline in public school
enrollment will continue at an accelerated pace. This means, of
course, that there will be more space in the public schools for any
parochial students who wish to enroll. This coupled with the fact
that space-cost studies in several states indicate there is now enough
space in the public schools to accommodate parochial school students
certainly blunts the argument of many proponents of church-re-
lated schools that such schools are bailing out the state's taxpayers
and the public schools and thus should receive some public financial
support.
It should also be recognized that the Supreme Court has re-
moved most of the practices in the public schools such as state-
sponsored prayers, Bible reading and related practices, that Roman
Catholics and others legitimately objected to as doctrinal vestiges
of Protestantism. If any remain in a particular school, protesters
should have little difficulty in seeing that they are removed. Thus,
bona fide religious objections to public school programs, which
were largely responsible for the Roman Catholic parochial school
system in the United States, have become minimal or nonexistent.
Finally, if there are other religious reasons why sects wish to
maintain parochial schools, of course, this is their constitutional
right, so long as other constitutional requirements, such as the
equal protection clause guarantees and general state standards, are
met. But there are fewer controlling reasons why taxpayers who
do not share these religious convictions should be called upon to
foot part of the bill. Certainly, if upper and middle class Protestants
wish to use the parochial or private school systems as a vehicle for
their children to avoid children of ethnic minorities or children
of lower socio-economic parents, they should pay the real cost of
such an education and should not expect tax support in their efforts
to skirt the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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